The Bases of Nation, Society and State: the crisis of Canada
by Abraham Weizfeld
saalaha@fokus.name
(Science Politique) l’Université du Québec à Montréal
Nationalism and Constitutional Crisis in Canada.
Wednesday 5 June / mercredi 5 juin, 13:45-15:15, NR-400
Coordinator & chair: Lorne A. Brown (Political Science, Regina)
Society for Socialist Studies
Learneds, Brock University
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Abstract
With the Canadian State in contradiction to the Kébékoize Nation, the General Will (citizenry) opposes the Common Will (Nation). Self-Determination fails as a solution because of, the inevitability of an opposing self-determination, and, the question of who determines national identity. The constitutional feasibility of sovereignty-association (national-cultural autonomy) is consequently dependent upon the construction of a pluralist society (civil society) replacing the State. If this process takes longer amongst anglophone Canadians it would result in the separation of Québec (Kébèk). However, each of these social dynamics nurture the other, as has been the experience in the past.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Table of Contents
1……… The Civic Conception of Nation……………………………………………………………………….. 5
2……… The Ethnic Conception of Nation……………………………………………………………………… 8
3……… The Evolution of the Civic and Organic Concepts………………………………………… 12
4……… National Minorities in the Modern Conceptions………………………………………………….. 14
5……… The Liberal Democratic State……………………………………………………………………….. 15
6……… The Federal Principle…………………………………………………………………………………….. 17
7……… The Iroquois Confederation…………………………………………………………………………….. 18
8……… The Crisis of Canada…………………………………………………………………………………………. 22
We know nationalism to be the conscious identity with a particular nation. This then indicates the presence of a nation. This national identity, is also defined as the collective consciousness of a People, with its culture, history, religion, language(s), or any other particularities perpetuated by such a People. In this sense a nation is defined by a People, since it is the people who conceive of the nation.
By investigating the nature of nationalism we do not presume to balance the various elements that will be laid out in order to provide an overall resultant of the worth of nationalism according to a moral or ideological standard. We need to know what goes into making the consciousness of nationalism to determine its role among the political forces of social life.
In this analysis there is no uniform nature of nationalism. This phenomenon presents contradictory influences in different situations. It also manifests contradictory characteristics simultaneously. By the methodology applied in the implementation of the nationalist consciousness the contradictions may arise. It is no wonder then that the phenomenon of nationalism is described in such wildly divergent if not contradictory terms by different observers. Therefore, the treatment of nationalism that follows, allows for contradictory tendencies and seeks to examine the opposing facets in and of themselves. As a result, we may then detect the consequences of the differing tendencies that are in effect. The internally counterpoised characteristics of nationalism themselves define the nation in contradictory terms. In order to examine the definitions of the nation we are obliged to look at the underlying consciousness that makes such criteria appear to be real.
The matter of territory is confused between two aspects that appear to be the same; the nation as the territory, and the territory as nation! This is the typical quandary that strikes the opening of the discussion of the nation. These two aspects, however, are not the same when the nation does not entirely live in the same territory, as amongst the Kébékois(ze) in Canada.
In the relation between territory and nation evidently one is not necessarily identical to the other. While a territory can be the common property of a nation, it is not necessarily true that the territory defines the nation, or that the nation shall define the territory. If this were the case then this notion would become an exclusive defining aspect of such a conception of the nation . By means of the citizenship granted by such a territorial administration, the hierarchical priority assumes that only the subjects of a State have a legal nationality .
The Dominion of Canada operates on the basis that there exists one legal national entity, that being Canadian. In a similar manner the territorially defined nation of the province of Québec exists in the context of State policy, whereas the Québécoise (Kébékoiz) nationality lives not only in that province but in various other provinces of Canada, and certain States of the northeast U.S.A. (2,835,398; 1990 US Census). In addition there exist affiliated francophone nationalities with the Québécoise, such as the Acadienne of New Brunswick and Louisiana, the Métisse of Manitoba, and various francophone indigenous peoples nationalities in the province of Québec itself. Consequently, a nation is grander than the particular members residing in the State administered territory which makes representation in the name of the nation.
The exclusive identity of a nation and a territory furthermore serves to define such a territory as existing only for that nation and none other. This construction of an empire as a country-state has its consequences in the differing modern examples of the Dominion of Canada, among others (settler-colonial states); where the subjugated nation is maintained as a reserve class / order of workers. The same tendency is also perpetuated among the workers in the economically dependent Canada in relation to the United States economy. The subordinate position of the indigenous First Peoples of Québec and North America in the hierarchical order of nations results in the waste of their land’s natural resources without even the opportunity of a compensating position as wage workers.
The aspirations of a national culture for self-sufficiency may be translated into becoming a discriminatory society if this self-sufficiency is conceived of as a thing in itself. By such means the national culture is equated with the society as if there were no other nations that exist in the society. That would be the conception of a State and the associated ideology of homogeneity. Those nationalities that live under such a State without those collective social rights that are granted to regular members of the society, are disfavoured because they are not of the same nationality who have established the State. This State has the function of guarding the priority of a founding nation in the chosen territory, by all necessary means.
The State’s assimilation of national minorities can be observed in the context of the British Empire. More recent reflections by similar means in modern times have perpetuated socio-economic discrimination derived from the hierarchical perspective. Currently such nations as this have become the rural or urban toiling classes. Resulting from the differences in origin between nations, a people such as the African Americans, or New Africans, were formed from the lower classes in that manner. In respect to Canada one can see the monarchist coat of arms with the symbol of the Province of Québec, the unicorn, chained at the neck to a crown in place like a horse’s work-collar. All this is printed on the front of the Canadian money bill, like a trophy.
With respect to the Kébékois(ze) People, Katherine O’Sullivan See has noted that;
The Durham Report, which resulted from this investigation, analyzed the situation in Canada as derivative from the fact of ‘two nations warring in the bosom of a single state’. Durham claimed that the solution to this war was simple: the assimilation of the French was a prerequisite to Canada’s survival and to the economic survival of the group. He wrote to the King:
If they attempt to better their condition by extending themselves over the neighboring country, they will get more and more mingled with the English population. If they prefer remaining stationary, the greater part of them must be labourers in the employ of the English capitalists. In either case, it would appear that in some measure, the vast majority of French Canadians are doomed to occupy an inferior position and to be dependent upon the English for employment’ (Rioux 1971: 51) [1]
1. The Civic Conception of Nation
Faced with the problem of a divided society one is obliged to consider its modern underpinnings in the references often given as justifications for the social projects that have been undertaken.
The moi commune of Rousseau acts as the incorporation of the general will into the body politic. This is considered to be the formation of the city-state and not a nation[2], although it is disputed insofar as the general will is regarded as being more than the sum of a collection of individuals. Rousseau’s editor G.D.H. Cole presents the misconception;
The term ‘general’ will means, in Rousseau, not so much ‘ will held by several persons ‘, as will having a general (universal) object. This is often misunderstood; but the mistake matters the less, because the General Will must, in fact, be both. [3]
Rousseau’s conception is nonetheless definitively interested in making a differentiation between the two;
There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will; the latter considers only the common interest, while the former takes private interest into account, and is no more than a sum of particular wills. [4]
What then is the character of the general will is more precisely defined in his essay A Discourse on Political Economy where he writes,
The body politic, therefore, is also a corporate being, possessed of a will; and this general will, which tends always to the preservation and welfare of the whole and of every part, and is the source of the laws, constitutes for all the members of the State, in their relations, to one another and to it, the rule of what is just or unjust. [5]
In this citation we have the sense of something more than a corporate entity. It has the sense of a living body with a consciousness that at one point he refers to as being the mind of the Deity as expressed by the general will. This is of course reminiscent of the theological conception of the nation, as well as Hegel’s National Mind. The precise designation made in the citation above refers to two constituent elements in the body politic. On the one hand there are “their relations to one another “, and on the other there is the relation ” to it “. The two notions are joined with an “and” so providing a prelude to the Hegelian concept of the Nation-State. It would be easy to note that the concept of civil society here corresponds to the notion of ” their relations to one another “, while the State would be best described by the reference ” to it “. The reference to “the whole ” and then “of every part ” seems to confirm this distinction. This concept of the body politic contains both a reference to the State and an allusion to the nation. This is however a difficult matter to determine with precision since the format of The Social Contract is based on the model of the Athenian Polis. At that time, when the European cultures had not yet become sufficiently populated to constitute a national society, and had not yet had the historical experience to bond into a nation, the national concept did not serve as a useful idea to incorporate into the prevailing social structure. The degree to which Rousseau would do so rests moreso in the subconscious, although the complex of existing social relations would have provided him with the elaborated concept of general will that he has expressed.
The civic conception of nation is limited in its significance as a result. This public domain is mainly concerned with the nature of representation in the nation, but not the nation per se. To the extent that Rousseau distinguishes the nation from the State, the nation is considered to be of greater significance.
In fact, does not the undertaking entered into by the whole body of the nation bind it to provide for the security of the least of its members with as much care as for that of all the rest? Is the welfare of a single citizen any less the common cause than that of the whole State? [6]
The State is here sacrificed instead of the nation, rather than violate the ” fundamental laws of society”. Society then cannot be considered equivalent to the State, or its laws.
For the fundamental conventions being broken, it is impossible to conceive of any right or interest that could retain the people in the social union; unless they were restrained by force, which alone causes the dissolution of the state of civil society. [7]
In this manner, the civil society is closely identified with the nation. The fundamental law / conventions are the Social Contract, otherwise considered to be the social constitution. The People is taken as a synonym for Nation when there is a distinction to be made from the State,
the body of the State, … we shall see that it will at length be reduced to a small number of persons, who are not the people, but the officers of the people [8]
Despite the integral conception of the people provided, however, the people or Nation, are considered individually, without a collective identity, apart from their particular general will. The particular wills found within the body politic are not identified as nationalities. In this way, the civic conception of the nation is based in the individual and their liberties alone.
2. The Ethnic Conception of Nation
Hegel seems to have a commonality for the State with Rousseau although they differ in its conception;
The philosophical treatment of these topics is concerned only with their inward side, with the thought of their concept. The merit of Rousseau’s contribution to the search for this concept is that, by adducing the will as the principle of the state, he is adducing a principle which has thought both for its form and its content, a principle indeed which is thinking itself, not a principle, like gregarious instinct, for instance, or divine authority, which has thought as its form only. Unfortunately, however, as Fichte (4) did later, he takes the will only in a determinate form as the individual will, and he regards the universal will not as the absolutely rational element in the will, but only as a ‘general’ will which proceeds out of this individual will as out of a conscious will. The result is that he reduces the union of individuals in the state to a contract and therefore to something based on their arbitrary wills, their opinion, and their capriciously given express consent; and abstract reasoning proceeds to draw the logical inferences which destroy the absolutely divine principle of the state, together with its majesty and absolute authority. For this reason, when these abstract conclusions came into power they afforded for the first time in human history the prodigious spectacle of the overthrow of the constitution of a great actual state and its complete reconstruction ab initio on the basis of pure thought alone, after the destruction of all existing and given material. The will of its re-founders was to give it what they alleged was a purely rational basis, but it was only abstractions that were being used; the Idea was lacking; and the experiment ended in the maximum of frightfulness and terror. (5) [9]
The Idea lacking was the Nation according to Hegel. Hegel discounts the state-Republic described by Rousseau as reduced to the format of a contract alone among various individual wills, which Hegel equates to the State. This misrepresentation, or lack of appreciation of Hegel’s discounts the character of the general will which is described by Rousseau as greater than the sum of its parts. Furthermore it is not at all clear that the general will was to be taken as the conception introduced for the purpose of describing the State alone. It is actually more appropriate to conceive of it being ascribed to the Civil Society, which has to be fundamentally differentiated from the State. This would fundamentally alter Hegel’s conception of the State as the fusion of Form and Content since the Nation as Form coexists with its content Civil Society .
Hegel himself very precisely does demarcate the character of the Civil Society;
188. Civil Society contains three moments:
(A) The mediation of need and one man’s satisfaction through his work and the satisfaction of the needs of all others — the System of Needs.
(B) The actuality of the universal principle of freedom therein contained — the protection of property through the Administration of Justice.
(C) Provision against contingencies still lurking in systems (A) and (B), and care for particular interests as a common interest, by means of the Police and the Corporation. [10]
While ignoring the fullest conception of the general will on the part of Rousseau, Hegel contains a conception of Civil Society that is very elaborate in terms of the economic and personal spheres of activity in Civil Society.
Taking into account the confused interchanges he makes between Society and the Nation, it could be said that Hegel goes beyond Rousseau in respect to Civil Society by presenting the epistemological basis for the Nation as being a reciprocal consciousness of common needs, a conception lacking in Rousseau. In Rousseau it is the State that limits the inherent divisiveness of Civil Society being as it is, in his conception, based in the particular wills of its citizenry. Hegel’s exegesis of Kant and Rousseau’s statism goes beyond the Content of Civil Society to incorporate the nation integrally.
The crucial point in both the Kantian and the generally accepted definition of right (see the introduction to Kant’s Philosophy of Law) (66) is the ‘ restriction which makes it possible for my freedom or self-will to coexist with the self-will of each and all according to a universal law ‘. On the one hand, this definition contains only a negative category, restriction, while on the other hand the positive factor — the universal law or the so-called ‘ law of reason’, the correspondence of the self-will of one individual with that of another — is tantamount to the principle of contradiction and the familiar notion of abstract identity. The definition of right which I have quoted involves; that way of looking at the matter, especially popular since Rousseau, (67) according to which what is fundamental, substantive, and primary is supposed to be the will of a single person in his own private self-will, not the absolute or rational will, and mind as a particular individual, not mind as it is in its truth. Once this principle is adopted, of course the rational can come on the scene only as a restriction on the type of freedom which this principle involves, and so also not as something immanently rational but only as an external abstract universal. This view is devoid of any speculative thinking and is repudiated by the philosophic concept. And the phenomena which it has produced both in men’s heads and in the world (68) are of a frightfulness parallel only to the superficiality of the thoughts on which they are based.
____________________
67. See e.g. Contract Social, i. 6, where the ‘ fundamental problem ‘ is said to be ‘ to find a form of association which will defend and protect the person and property of each associate, and wherein each member, united to all the others, still obeys himself alone, and retains his original freedom ‘. i.e. what is fundamental is the single individual and his natural liberty; the task of the state is merely to protect these. [11]
The individual however is fundamental only in itself and not for itself since the human species is a social being and really only finds fulfillment in the recognition received and the benefits derived in the collectivity. The individual human is only such in itself and only becomes human actually when it is for itself , by releasing its potential in the social context. Freedom of speech, for example, is only possible if there is someone to hear. Freedom then is a function of society and not the individual per se.
Hegel continues to present a conception of society, the nation together with the state; these facets of political existence are considered to be united in the same process even though they had been presented as developing in different manners.
The expansion of the family, as its transition into a new principle, is in the external world sometimes its peaceful expansion until it becomes a people, i.e. a nation, which this has a common natural origin, or sometimes the federation of scattered groups of families under the influence of an overlord’s power [a State – W] or as a result of a voluntary association produced by the tie of needs and the reciprocity of their satisfaction [a Society – W]. [12]
In his paragraphs numbered 341 and 344, Hegel makes precise distinctions in reference to the nation and to civil society. The differentiation between the two is presented in the following terms;
It is therefore
(A) ethical mind in its natural or immediate phase — the Family. This substantiality loses its unity, passes over into division, and into the phase of relation, i.e. into
(B) Civil Society — an association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality which, because of their self-subsistence, is only abstract. Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal system — the means to security of person and property — and by an external organization for attaining their particular and common interests. This external state
(C) is brought back (18) to and welded into unity in the Constitution of the State which is the end and actuality of both the substantial universal order and the public life devoted thereto. [13]
Civil Society is thus defined, even though it rests imbedded with the notion of universality derived from the assumption of national homogeneity, and although it is also considered as naturally dependent upon the State as an external organization. Rousseau seems to avoid this pitfall by elaborating his general will into a conception for civil society and bypassing the concept of nation.
Hegel merely incorporates the nation into the state by definition;
#70 mind has become the state — the mind of a nation objectified in its rational and organic institutions. [14]
In this manner Hegel combines the civic conception of Rousseau’s and his own organic conception into one, that of the State. Nonetheless Hegel marks out two components of the State; the “rational” and the “organic” institutions. It would seem then that the rational refers to the State institutions, and the
organic refers to the national institutions of Civil Society. It is the Civil Society that is incorporated into the State superstructure. This is the nature of the Hegelian Nation-State. The institutions of the remaining Nations do not have access to the State institutions as a result unless they can demonstrate their utility by upholding that Nation-State.
3. The Evolution of the Civic and Organic Concepts
Theories of nationalism are divided by their definition of the nation. Stalin and Lenin’s famous and oft-quoted point criteria was seemingly patterned to define the Nation. These various formalist criteria amounted to one operative principle,
Thus, [according to Stalin — GS] a common economic life, economic cohesion, is one of the characteristic features of a nation. 6
_________
6. Stalin, Joseph Marxism and the Nation-Colonial Question, Proletarian Publishers, San Francisco, 1975, p. 20 [15]
The economic system of capitalism was considered the unifying force of nation building, and in effect the nation became a bourgeois phenomenon according to that paradigm. This economic determinist model actually pertains to the State formation that it has mistaken for the nation itself because of the adoption of the Hegelian conception of Nation-State..
Apart from the formal criteria as to what constitute a Nation, the principle of nationality is essentially that a People which has a sense of self-recognition, is the only fundamental criterion. Herder’s attitude was that “A Volk is virtually any group that has a name and a culture.” [16] Gerry Sperling notes that;
Stalin realized that there was something intangible about nationhood, as well, something which he referred to as national character in quotation marks and which he summed up as . . . a common psychological makeup, which manifests itself in a common culture . . . 7
__________
7. Ibid., p. 22 [17]
In considering the various discussions of the nation, evidently the lack of coherency on the subject results from the varying treatments of the same concept, so as to be reconciled with the ideological predisposition of the writer.
Nous avons constaté qu’à travers l’histoire de l’étude de la question nationale, chez les marxists comme chez les non-marxists, s’étaient peu à peu distinguées la question de l’État et celle de la nation comme groupe spécifique. [18]
Although such a distinction is made in one instance here by Bourque, there is still a general tendency to treat the nation as a bourgeois creation identified with the State, tending to annul the nation in the form of a People as a consideration.
The Polish-Canadian academic Kawczak treats the nation as a specific entity apart from the State;
The concept of nation
What constitutes a nation? There are two ways to define the concept of nation. One is to identify a nation as the people who live on a territory under the same supreme political authority. In other words, a nation is the population of a state. This definition emphasizes the political rather than the sociological aspect.
The other, more sociological way to define a notion is to identify it with what is meant by nationality. Usually, nationality is defined as an enduring community of people bound by common origin, fate, culture, language, territory and economic connections. All these bonds normally give rise to a consciousness of belonging together, of having a common “national identity”. This feeling of national identity is sometimes so strong that a community may aspire to be considered a nation even if it is not politically organized as a separate and independent state.
From the standpoint of nationalism the identification of nation with nationality seems to make more sense than the view that strictly binds the concept of nation to a state. [19]
While the nation is here described by an accumulation of characteristics these need not be taken as obligatory. Kawczak’s philosophical conceptualization is more to the point than the sociological references he makes, as well.
In contrast, the standard interpretation by Marxist thought on the national question falters on the proposition that the Nation is given expression by a State superstructure, that is, the Hegelian conception.
4. National Minorities in the Modern Conceptions
Let us continue with the analysis of nation-State. Hegel presents the earliest expression of this formulation that my readings have uncovered,
#331 The nation state is mind in its substantive rationality and immediate actuality and is therefore the absolute power on earth. [20]
This formulation unveils the illness derived from Herder which equates the nation with the State, in the sense that the State is formed to encompass one and only one nation. While this may be essential to the Hegelian conception of State it is nonetheless not an accurate reflection of Society. In order to resolve the contradiction with the State at large, it is presumed that the Society comprises just one nationality and that other national social formations are nonexistent, by way of redefinition into some other catagory such as that of a religion or language grouping only. The proposition for assimilation into the dominant Nation and its State is the problematic.
It is this abstraction of the Nation-State that sets up a false image of the Society, that comprises a false consciousness, and that ends by being in contradiction with the actuality. And it is the actual that is real and not that ideology.
Following from his presumption, Hegel is led into hierarchy when different rights are counterpoised:
Yet at the same time collision involves another moment, namely the fact that it is restrictive, and so if two rights collide one is subordinated to the other. It is only the right of the world-mind which is absolute without qualification. [21]
The practice of priority in the collision of rights is followed in Hegelian society between nationalities where basically the matter of the interaction of wills, and in particular, the interaction of a will and its other is in question. It is the role of the State to subordinate one will to the other, but there is no basis in theory to subordinate the other to the one, or the one to the other. The choice to subordinate one or the other to its negative is a special interest preference and not a function of necessity, unless we are to consider self-determination a necessity as defined by the interests of one special interest. The priority of the State, or its divine right, is tied to the existing source of power seeking to maintain its own stability by means of the State. This is far from the needs of a society. Consequently, the role of the State is distinct from that of the national communities, and for the same reason the State is evidently an impediment to a minority nation’s expression as an autonomous national-cultural collective will.
5. The Liberal Democratic State
The Liberal theory of social management assumes the perpetuation of social contradictions and seeks to limit or restrict their effects by legal mechanisms designed by the political authority and carried out by the judicial apparatus defending the liberal principle of limitations.
The Liberal social theory is further constrained by the legal definition of an entity being solely the individual, and the reproductive collectivity only being the family as headed by the male individual. That individual, the head of the household , is a vestige of the propertied and patriarchal definition of the person that excluded women, servants, slaves, and foreigners. This idea of equality by individuality is maintained in contradiction to the collectivity of nationality. The individual is placed in opposition to the collectivity, and collective rights are negated by the priority placed upon the individual rights currently in effect. Collective national rights are consequently in contradiction to the State, as has been revealed in the Canadian context. Recognition of the existence of nationalities other than the officially recognized State nationality is thus treated as illegal though there may be two official languages. In effect language is dissociated from the national culture from which it arose.
Collective rights are interpreted according to ideology, and Stuart Rush comments on their constitutional application in Canada.
There are two ways in which collective rights can be perceived constitutionally. First, collective rights are those rights which accrue to individuals because of their placement or membership in an identifiable group. In this sense, the realisation of the rights for each individual depends on its realisation for everyone in the group. These are the rights of cultural communities, ethnic and minority groups. They include the working people of Canada. These rights are rooted in history and represent a benefit or protection to the group as a whole. These would include: the right to employment; the rights of ethnic minorities to use their languages and to practise certain traditions; and the right to participate in government. Second, collective rights are also rights which accrue to groups as groups. These include: the right of Indian people to title to and jurisdiction over their aboriginal land; and the right of women to affirmative action programmes in the workplace. Group rights, which insure the protection of a group, as a group, ought to have been provided for in the Constitution [of 1982 – A.W.]. [22]
The limitations imposed by the liberal State are coached in the context of a morality proclaimed by a Theocracy. Alternatively, a collective autonomy of the various social formations in society could cooperate according to a methodology based in a Principle of Reciprocity. In place of the rule of the Law, operating on behalf of the State and its enforcers, there may exist the cultural attributes of mutuality nurtured in civil jurisprudence, as is the right of the citizen jury presently.
The reliance upon the individual in liberal theory abstractly grants the utmost in personal liberty but fails to recognize the context in which the individual finds themselves, whether that is a class context, a national identity or a particular gender.
Every political society is composed of other smaller societies of different kinds, each of which has its interests and its rules of conduct: but those societies which everybody perceives, because they have an external and authorized form, are not the only ones that actually exist in the State: all individuals who are united by a common interest compose as many others, either transitory or permanent, whose influence is none the less real because it is less apparent, and the proper observation of whose various relations is the true knowledge of public morals and manners. The influence of all these tacit or formal associations causes, by the influence of their will, as many different modifications of the public will. The will of these particular societies has always two relations; for the members of the association, it is a general will; for the great society, it is a particular will; and it is often right with regard to the first object, and wrong as to the second. An individual may be a devout priest, a brave soldier, or a zealous senator, and yet a bad citizen. A particular resolution may be advantageous to the smaller community, but pernicious to the greater. It is true that, particular societies always being subordinate to those that contain them, the latter should be obeyed rather than the former; the duty of a citizen takes precedence of that of a senator, and a man’s duty of that of a citizen: but unhappily personal interest is always found in inverse ratio to duty, and increases in proportion as association grows narrower, and the engagement less sacred; which irrefragably proves that the most general will is always the most just also, and that the voice of the people is in fact the voice of God. [23]
Rousseau provides us with a hierarchical version of pluralism because of the individualist criterion for civil society.
6. The Federal Principle
The work of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon was concerned with the mutualist political current when he proposed a form of society that rejected the centralized State in favour of federal relations among the constituents of a country. In writing to the editor of the journal L’Impartial he insisted, as cited by George Woodcock;
Why should we not invite the population to make themselves capable of managing their own affairs and of preparing the way for a confederation of peoples? Let them see, through instruction, science, moral health and patriotism, how to dispense with all ministerial and constitutional hierarchy, while in the meantime profiting from the little good it will do them. [24]
Proudhon’s biographer George Woodcock further interpretes this conception,
Thus the nation itself will be a confederation of regions, and Europe a confederation of confederations in which the interest of the smallest province will have as much expression as that of the largest, since all affairs will be settled by mutual agreement, contract and arbitration. [25]
The concept of confederation is obviously different from the current usage in Canada and should rather mean the mutual relations of autonomous social formations. The mechanism of decision-making follows in the same vein through the proposal that a process of unanimity would be operational by the indicated mechanisms of mutuality. Such political means can be augmented by the procedures followed in the Iroquois Confederation decision-making process which also is based upon a form of unanimity.
The compatibility of the Federal Principle and national formations is also alluded to above by Proudhon, based as it is upon the differentiation between the Society and the State, despite the deficiencies of Anarchist ideology with respect to the nation.
In contrast, Reg Whitaker mentions the Federal Principle in a presentation of state federalism that interprets the matter as a government of governments. Concerning Canada and Québec he concludes with an appreciation of the Constitution Act of 1982 as “a reasonable compromise between a number of conflicting pressures.” [26] Collective Rights as a nation are absent as such from his analysis of the superstructure.
7. The Iroquois Confederation
The Kaianere’ko:wa, or The Law of the Great Peace / The Great Law is the traditionalist code of society before the influx of Europeans to this continent. This constitutional law unified the five founding nations or tribes of northeast North America to become the HAUDENOSAUNEE or The People of the Long House: Iroquois. This initial united nations has also been called the League of the Five, or the Iroquois Confederation. It is this treaty that contributed to the elaboration of the constitution of the United States of America and the Confederation of Canada, and may represents the oldest constitution still applied in the world. [27]
This Great Binding Law [28] was initially elaborated with the formation of the League of the Five Nations about the year 1390 and was transmitted in the inscriptions of the Wampum belts — coded beads forming symbolic designs — held by the women chiefs, and coded strings for particular laws or paragraphs, in addition to oral recitations, until it was printed in more recent times. This assembly of the various Peoples’ representatives was in effect an ancient Parliament that sat in discussion of any dispute serious enough to warrant the calling together of the delegates.
According to the Iroquois Book of the Great Law, the confederate Council was to consist of fifty rodiyaners (civil chiefs) and was to be divided into three bodies; that is, the older brothers; Mohawk and the Seneca, the younger brothers; Cayuga and the Oneida, and, the fire keepers; Onondaga. Each brotherhood debated a question separately and reported to the fire keepers, who referred the matter back and ordered a unanimous report. If the two brotherhoods still disagreed, the fire keepers had the final decision. If, however, the brotherhoods agreed and their decision was not in accord with the wishes of the fire keepers, the fire keepers could only confirm the decision, for unanimity was the law required for the passage of any question. Similarly the Council chooses to convene to consider any particular question presented to it, acting in effect as a Supreme Court. All the work of the Council was done without an executive head, that is, without a head of State or government, such as a president or prime minister. These fifty civil chiefs were nominated by certain noble women who carried a hereditary title in their family, so elaborating a matrilineal society recognized officially as an electoral college; nominations were confirmed by popular councils of both men and women, and then finally by the confederate Council. Women had not only the great power to nominate the rulers but also the power to depose them for incompetency in office. Here, then, we find the right of popular nomination, recall and of women’s suffrage.[29]
It is noteworthy that there is no mention of private property in the traditional documentation. Land is considered to be a given that is, existing in itself and not conferring special privileges upon a particular individual. Territory held in common is inherent in the conception of a People or nation, such as the Mohawk. The idea of property in land is absent, and land itself is thus treated as existing in the public domain.[30]
In a parallel fashion we may remind ourselves that land came to be considered a common national resource during the course of the English revolution, when Crown Lands became Common Land in the manner of a territorial nationalization.
The Inter-national perspective means the territorial integrity of the Native Peoples’ nations by the recognition of independent nations in polynational societies through reciprocal relations, as in the theory of Federation.
A social formation that becomes a society may be based in a national-culture as it exists in reciprocity with other suchlike formations. Such a project is possible through the mutual recognition represented in a common society amongst the major constituent nationalities, as well as the proportionally less populous nationalities. Consequently, the same methodology may be applied among the global societies and nations.
The relations engendered by the various national cultures and their societies form the Inter and Intra-National dynamic of a resolution towards mutual recognition, reciprocal interchanges and mutual aid. Currently imposed upon this social-formation is a superstructure of State institutions that constitute the International system of politics. This defines the distinction between the terms Inter-National [1] — concerning relations between Nations — and the term International that relates to the relations between States, as in the UNO (United Nations Organization).
Currently we see the Fragmentation of the State into various Nations that have retained their historic memory. With the imposition of the State formation the equality of national status is compromised by the centralized nature of that structure and its accompanying cultural homogenization or dictatorship of a minority, or perhaps, a majority of the citizens. The lack of collective rights within the State, in this manner, compromises the rights of the citizen to their national identity. Minority national collectives in particular are hampered by the imposition of a majoritarian dictatorship (as in the Hobbesian sense). This lack of national recognition results in the Fragmentation taking place at an accelerating pace throughout this century.
As originally perceived in the “Federal principle”,[31] it is possible to conceive of Society as composed of various social formations that are nationally-autonomous. As Proudhon did, this is to distinguish Society from the State, which can be loosely defined here as an exclusive property in territory that contains a certain population of individuals.
It is projected here that the nature of social representation may be altered to form a criteria of approval that is based upon a consensus of unanimity amongst the various social formations rather than simply majoritarianism ( or democracy as it is named ). The social process that is unanimity takes root in the collective network of social formations based in their particular autonomous social orientation. Unanimity becomes the ongoing series of negotiations for the allocation of scarce resources and the development of the means to supply the social needs that are projected. The lack of particular resources gives rise to an increased momentum towards global societal interaction engendering an Inter-National climate of exchange in resources, technology, nationalities, and information.
8. The Crisis of Canada
In the June-July 1977 issue of the journal Canadian Forum, A Proposal For a New Constitution presented by The Committee For a New Constitution appeared. Despite the proposals for a popularly elected constitutional assembly, this project has not been possible and seems unlikely until the Québécoise (Kébékoiz) nation achieves its autonomy or independence from the State of Canada.
This proposal for the drafting of a social constitution to be ratified by submission to the public is based in the preeminence of the civil society over the State apparatus. This concept isunlike the previous experiences in formulating a constitution when the central State was dominant. The British North America Act was legalized per saltum (in one leap) without debate by the Imperial government in collusion with the dependent Canadian elite and the Québec Catholic Church apparatus. With even the admonition of the Bishop of Rimouski that:
‘You will respect this new constitution that is given you as the expression of the supreme will of the legislator, of the legitimate authority, and consequently that of God Himself.’ [32]
the Québec electorate returned 20 opposition members to 40 government supporters. The constitution of 1982 was not even submitted for public approval since the government of Québec itself did not approve it.
In contrast the methodology presented by the Canadian Forum proposal presented here anticipates that upon the,
event that Quebec chooses independence with association, the rest of Canada should be in a position to propose terms of association. … [by means of] the creation of a popularly elected constituent assembly charged with drafting a new constitution . . . including provision for terms of association with Quebec (in the event that Quebec should so opt) which would then be submitted to public ratification. [33]
Such a process would undoubtedly transform English-speaking Canada as much as Québec would be changing. Considering the lack of viable current proposals being presented on behalf of a united Canada it seems that we are both moving into a period of mutual transformation. No doubt English-speaking Canda is less prepared to do so, however it is not in a position to be able to impose its will to the contrary, considering that the population of Québec comprises some 27-29% of the general population.
What has not been considered is the extent of the influence that is to be felt by the Kébékois(ze) nation. While this nation comprises only 80% of the province of Québec itself, the Kébekois(ze) reside throughout the rest of Canada and in the United States as well. This national identification poses political questions about the nature of society in general. If there is to be a pluralist political culture then evidently it will have to include the collective identity and rights of the Kébékois(ze) national minority. And if the Kébékois(ze) achieve their national collective identity then other national minorities will seek to do so as well, as have the indigenous native peoples. Not only is such a pluralist political agenda posed in Canada, it is also posed for the U.S.A. within which the national minorities of African-Americans / New Africans, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Spanish-speaking Americans as well as Native peoples will find the example of the new Kébèk [2] to be appealing.
Notes
[1] O’Sullivan See, K. The Social Origins of Ethnic-National Identities in Ireland and Canada,
pgs. 107 – 129,
National and Ethnic Movements, ed. Jacques Dofny and Akinsola Akiwowo, SAGE Studies in International Sociology 19,
International Sociological Associates, Beverly Hills & London, 1980, p. 121
[2] Cole, G.D.H. Introduction, pgs. xi – xliv
The Social Contract and Discourses, Jean-Jacques Rousseau
Dent, London, 1975 , p. xxix
[3] Cole ibid., p. xliii
[4] Rousseau, J-J The Social Contract and Discourses
Dent, London, 1975, p. xxxii
[5] Rousseau ibid.,
A Discourse on Political Economy, pgs. 117 – 153, p. 120-121
[6] Rousseau ibid., p. 132
[7] Rousseau ibid., p. 132
[8] Rousseau ibid., p. 132
[9] Hegel, G.F.W. Philosophy of Right
Oxford University Press, London, (1942) 1949, p. 156
[10] Hegel op. cit., p. 126
[11] Hegel op. cit., p. 33
[12] Hegel op. cit., p. 122
[13] Hegal op. cit., p. 110, para. #157
[14] Hegel op. cit., p. 33, para. #70
[15] Sperling, Gerry Prolegomena for a discussion of socialism and the National Question
Socialist Studies Conference, Kingston, Ontario
University of Regina, June 1, 1991, p. 3
[16] Manuel, Frank E. Introduction to Reflections on The Philosophy of the History of Mankind
by Johann Gottfried von Herder
University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. xiv
[17] Sperling, Gerry op. cit., p. 3
[18] Bourque op. cit., p. 55
“We have insisted that throughout the history of the study of the national question that it was the case that little by little, both among the Marxists and the non-Marxists, that the State was distinguished from that of the Nation as a specific group.”
[19] Kawczak, A. Nationalism, Mental Health and Human Development, pgs. 231 – 253
Mental Health in a Changing World, ed. Brunon Holyst
The Polish Society for Mental Health, Warsaw, 1990, p. 236 – 7
[20] Hegel op. cit., p. 212, para. #331
[21] Hegel op. cit., p. 33, para. #70
[22] Rush, Stewart Collective Rights and Collective Process:
Missing Ingredients in the Canadian Constitution
Socialist Studies/Études Socialistes:
A Canadian Annual no.2, 1984, p. 1 – 2
[23] Rousseau op. cit., p. 121-122
[24] Woodcock Pierre-Joseph Proudhon : A Biography
Black Rose Books, Montreal, New York, 1987, p. 21
[25] Woodcock ibid., p. 249
[26] Whitaker, Reg Democracy, Federalism and the
National Political Communities in Canada
Socialist Studies/Études Socialistes:
A Canadian Annual No. 2, 1984, p. 11
[27] Weizfeld, eibie Native People’s Law Code, pgs. 374 – 375
Reader’s Digest Legal Problem Solver
Brott, Nelson, ed.
The Reader’s Digest Association (Canada) Ltd., Montreal, 1994
[28] Kaianere’ko:wa:
La “Grand Bien” Pleine Terre, Vol. I No. 1, Solstice d’été, 1992
[29] Parker, A.C. The Constitution of the Five Nations or
The Iroquois Book of the Great Law,
Iroqrafts Ltd., Ohsweken, Ontario, Canada, 1984 (1916)
[30] Kaianere’ko:wa:
Le ‘Grand Bien’ op. cit.
[31] Proudhon,
Pierre-Joseph The Federal Principle
University of Toronto Press, Toronto
[32] Dowson, Ross Quebec & the Canada Crisis:
for a Constituent Assembly and a new Canadian Constitution.,
Forward Publications, Toronto, October 1977, p. 4
[33] Dowson, Ross ibid., p. 14 – 16
[1]. see paper prepared for use at the International Studies Association Conference in Chicago, February 22-25, 1995 by Fred W. Riggs, Professor Emeritus, Political Science Department, University of Hawaii, entitled:
TURMOIL AMONG NATIONS, A CONCEPTUAL ESSAY:
Ethnonationalism, Authoritarianism, Anarchy, and Democracy
p. 10
[2]. this term is based in the original name for the territorial around the waterways entering the North American continent given to the original French settlers by the Algonkin nation.
abraham Weizfeld 
Leave a comment